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564 LEWIS v. NEBLETT [48 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 23998. In Bank. May 24, 1957.] 
IDA LEWIS, Respondent, v. WILLIAM H. NEBLETT, as 
Administrator, etc., AppelJant. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Actions-Limitations: Powers of Admin-
istrator-Compromise of Claims.-The reason an adlllinistrator 
is not empowered to waive the defense provided by a stlltute 
of limitations in an acbon against the estate is that he acts 
as trustee for credItors of the estate and for the heirs and is 
not at liberty to deplete the assets of the estate by not asserting 
a valid, existing defense, but when it is questionable whether an 
action against the estate i8 barred by the statute of limitations 
the administrator may enter into an agreement compromising 
the action, since it may be advantageous to the estate to do so, 
and for the same reason an administrator, before the period 
prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, has expired, may enter 
into a stipulation extending the time within which an action 
against the estate must be brought to trial. 
[2] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Stipulations.-
In an action against an estate to establish a trust in real prop-
erty standing in decedent's name at the time of his death, the 
administrator was authorized to enter into a stipulation ex-
tending the time for trial five days before the five-year period 
prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, expired where there was 
pending the possibility of a settlement which might have been 
advantageous to the estate, and it was immaterial to the ques-
tion of his authority that the stipulation was not filed until 
some nine days after such five-year period expired where the 
stipulation was filed prior to the motion to dismiss, this being 
all with respect to filing thnt § 583 requires. 
[3] ld.-Delay in BriDging Action to Trial-Stipulations.-Not 
every stipulation for an extension of time beyond the five-year 
period prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an 
action to trial is exhausted by the first succeeding court order 
fixing a date for trial; where counsel for the respective parties 
entered into a stipulation that the case be continued until 
May 23 of a given year "or as soon thereafter as may be con-
venient to the court," the court's order setting May 3 of that 
year as the date of trial did not exhaust the stipulation since 
there remained 20 daTS to the earliest date mentioned in the 
stipulation, and a subsequent order setting the case for trial 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, §§ 288, 1049. 
[2] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 39. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, §§ 195,834; [2,3] 
Dismissal, § 68; [4] 'J;rusts, § 324(3}. 
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on May 26 and a one-day delay to May 27, on which dat~ 
trial commenced, were within the stipulation. 
[4] Trusts-Actions to Establisb-Limitations.-An action against 
an estate to establish a trust in real property standing in 
decedent's name at the time of his death was not barred by 
the three-year statute of limitations (Cod~ Civ. Proc., § 338, 
subd. 4), although one of plaintiff's witnesses testified that 
some five or six years prior to filing the action plaintiff's 
sister and her husband came to this state and that at that time 
in plaintiff's presence there was a violent argument between 
decedent and plaintiff's relatives during which the relatives 
demanded that decedent produce proof that the property was 
held in plaintiff's nllme, which decedent refused to do, where 
it could not be said as a matter of law that this incident was 
sufficient to put plaintiff on notice of decedent's fraud, in view 
of testimony by the same witness that decedent explained his 
refusal to produce proof that the property was in plaintiff's 
name, apparently to plaintiff's satisfaction, on the ground that 
the relatives were trying to take the property from her and 
that, since plaintiff knew the property was in her name, it was 
unnecessary to prove that fact to the relatives. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against an estate to establish a trust in real prop-
erty standing in decedent's name at the time of his death. 
Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Harry W. Dudley for Appellant. 
Leonard D. Nasatir for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action against the 
estate of Eddie .... V. Sellers to establish a trust in certain real 
property standing in Sellers' name at the time of his death. 
The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the action for plain-
tiff's failure to bring it to trial within five years and, after 
trial without a jury, made findings of fact and conclusions 
of law favorable to plaintiff and entered judgment accordingly. 
Defendant appeals. 
Defendant contends that the action should have been dis-
missed for plaintiff's failure to bring it to trial within the 
five-year period prescribed by section 583 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. A chronology of the events bearing upon 
the applicability of section 583 follows: 
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October 19, 1949. Plaintiff filed her complaint naming 
as defendant Bessie Sellers as administratrix of the estate of 
Eddie W. Sellers. 
March 9, 1954. On plaintiff's motion, trial of the case was 
postponed to July 7, 1954. 
June 4, 1954. Bessie Sellers was removed as administratrix 
by court order. 
July 7, 1954. On defendant's motion, trial of the case was 
postponed to October 28, 1954. 
August 4, 1954. Harry Aides was appointed administrator. 
October 13, 1954. Aides was substituted for Bessie Sellers 
as defendant in the action. 
October 14, 1954. Plaintiff's attorney and the attorney for 
Aides entered into a written stipulation providing that the 
case "be continued for trial from the 28th day of October, 
1954 ... to such time after the 1st of January, 1955, as may 
be set by the Presiding Judge," reciting as the reason for the 
stipulation that "there is pending the possibility of settlement 
of said above matter and that the Superior Court will be 
asked to approve a Petition for Settlement of same, .•. " 
October 19, 1954. The five-year period within which an 
action must be brought to trial under section 583 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure expired. 
October 21, 1954. Bessie Sellers fUed a complaint in inter-
vention alleging that she and the decedent's minor son were 
the real parties in interest, denying the charging allegations 
of plaintiff's complaint, and praying that plaintiff take noth· 
ing by her action. 
October 28, 1954. The stipulation entered into on October 
14 was filed, and on defendant's motion trial was postponed 
to February 16, 1955. 
February 15, 1955. Plaintiff's attorney and the attorney 
for Aides entered ipto and filed a written stipulation provid. 
ing that the case "be continued to a date subsequent to the 
hearing on the petition for authority to compromise claims 
against the estate now pending .... " 
February 16, 1955. The court ordered the case continued 
to April 4, 1955. 
April 4, 1955. Plaintiff's attorney and the attorney for 
Aides entered into and filed a written stipulation providing 
that the case "be continued until May 23, 1955, or as soon 
thereafter as may be convenient to the court," and the court 
ordered the case continued to May 3, 1955. 
April 15, 1951). The intervener filed notice of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to bring the action to trial within five years.. 
) 
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April 29, 1955. Harry Aides resigned as administrator with 
court approval. William Neblett, attorney for the intervener, 
was appointed administrator and substituted as defendant in 
the action. 
May 3, 1955. On plaintiff's motion, trial of the case was 
postponed to May 26, 1955. 
May 27, 1955. Trial commenced, and the court granted the 
intervener's motion that her complaint be dismissed as moot. 
Section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Any 
action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed 
. . . on motion of the defendant, after due notice to plaintiff 
or by the court upon its own 'motion, unless such action is 
brought to trial within five years after the plaintiff has filed 
his action, except where the parties have filed a stipulation in 
writing that the time may be extended. . .. " 
Relying upon the stipulations entered into by her attorney 
and the attorney for Harry Aides, who was then administrator 
and defendant, plaintiff contends that" the parties have filed 
a stipulation in writing that the time may be extended," and 
that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss. 
Defendant contends that the five-year time limit prescribed 
by section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a statute of 
limitations within the meaning of section 708 of the Probate 
Code, which provides: "No claim which is barred by the 
statute of limitations shall be allowed or approved by the 
executor or administrator," that an adminIstrator has no 
power to waive the defense provided by a statute of limitations 
in an action against the estate (Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 
335, 338-339 [60 P. ~77) ; Fontal1a. Land Co. v. Laughlin, 199 
Cal. 625, 636-637 [250 P. 669, 48 A.L.R.1308]), and that Aides 
therefore had no power to enter into a stipulation extending 
the time limit prescribed by section 583. 
It is unnecessary to determine whether or not the five-year 
period prescribed by section 583 is a statute of limitations, for 
even if it is, it does not follow. that an administrator cannot 
enter into a stipulation extending the time for trial when 
the statutory period has not expired or when, because of a 
prior valid stipulation by the administrator, section 583 COll-
stitutes no bar to further prosecution of the action. [1] The 
reason an administrator is not empowered to waive the de-
fense provided by a statute of limitations in an action against 
the estate is that he acts as a trustee for creditors of the estate 
and for the heirs and is not at liberty to deplete the assets of 
) 
) 
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the estate by failing to assert a valid, existing defense. (Ftm-
ta7la Land Co. v. Laughlin, supra, 199 Cal at 636-637.) When 
:t is questionable whether an action against the estate is 
barred by the .statute of limitations, the administrator may 
omter into an agreement compromising the action, for it may 
be advantageous to the estate to do so. (Estate of Luccu, 23 
Ca1.2d 454, 466-467 [144 P.2d 340].) Since it may also be 
-:.0 the advantage of the estate, an administrator, before the 
period prescribed by section 583 has expired, may enter into 
a S"Jpulation extending the time within which an action against 
:he estate must be brought to trial. (See Union Savings Bank 
v. Barrett, 132 Cal. 453, 455 [64 P. 713, 1071].) 
(2) The foregoing chronology discloses that Aides, as ad-
ministrator, entered into the first stipulation extending the 
::me for trial five days before the five-year period expired. 
The reason for the stipulation was that there was pending 
the possibility of a settlement, which might well have been 
advantageous to the estate. It appears, therefore, that Aides, 
as administrator, was authorized to enter into the stipulation 
of October 14. It is immaterial to the question of his authority 
:b.a:: the stipulation was not filed in the action until October 
:!S. Once the stipulation was validly executed, either party 
·~ould file it. The stipulation was filed prior to the motion to 
,iismiss, and that is all with respect to filing that section 583 
~luires. (Estate of Thatcher, 120 Cal.App.2d 811, 814 [262 
P.:2J 337] and cases there cited.) 
The second stipulation postponing the time for trial was 
~:ered into and filed on February 15, 1955, and the third on 
.:!.;·ril 4, 1955. On both occasions the extended time under the 
c:e·:edent stipulation had not expired and therefore section 
-;;:3 did not bar further prosecution of the action. 
[3] Defendant contends that even if Aides was authorized 
~:.' enter into these stipulations, a stipulation extending the 
:::rre to a specified date does not authorize postponements be-
YQr:,-'i that date (City of Los Angeles v. SlIpe1'ior Court, 185 
Cal. 405, 409-410 [197 P. 79]) ; that the stipulation of April 
4. 1955, was exhausted by the court's order fixing May 3, 
::,~):Sj. as the date for trial; that no further delay was stipulated 
:0: and that when trial was not commenced on May 3, the 
~'}crt should have dismissed the action on its own motion. 
Defendant relies on Hunt v. United Artists Studio, 79 Cal. 
.!.pp.2d 619, 622 [180 P.2d 460]. The stipulation in that 
~&Se authorized a continuance to "such time as suits the 
?ourt," and it was held t11at the subsequent order of the 
-lOurt fixing January 3, 1945, as the date for trial exhausted 
') 
) 
) 
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the stipulation and that subsequent postponements were un-
authorized by that stipUlation. Not every stipulation for an 
extension of time, however, is exhausted by the first succeeding 
court order fixing a date for trial. (C/. MercanUZe Inv. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. 770, 773 [25 P .2d 12].) The stipu-
lation of April 4 provided that the case might be "continued 
until May 23, 1955, or as soon thereafter as may be convenient 
to the court." Obviously, the court's order setting May 3 as 
the date for trial did not exhaust the stipulation, for there 
remained 20 days to the earliest date mentioned in the stipu-
lation. The subsequent order setting the case for trial on May 
26 and the one-day delay to May 27, on which date trial com-
menced, were within the stipUlation. 
[4] Defendant also contends that the action is barred by 
the statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 4.) 
The trial court found that plaintiff cannot read, write, or 
figure and that she relied on the decedent for personal and' 
business advice; that in 1941 the decedent accepted a sum of 
money from plaintiff and agreed to use it to purchase for plain-
tiff the real property in question j that the decedent fraudu-
lently took title to the property in his own name and concealed 
that fact from plaintiff j and that plaintiff had no information 
to put her on inquiry as to the state of the title until the de-
cedent's death in JUly, 1949, three months before the filing 
of this action. Defendant relies on the testimony of one of 
plaintiff's witnesses that in 1943 or 1944 plaintiff's sister and 
her husband came to California and that at that time in the 
presence of plaintiff there was a violent argument between 
the decedent and plaintiff's relatives during which the rela-
tives demanded that the decedent produce proof that the prop-
erty was held in plaintiff's name and that the decedent refused 
to produce such proof. Defendant contends that as a matter 
of law this incident was sufficient to put plaintiff on notice of 
tlle decedent's fraud. The same witness, however, testified 
that the decedent explained his refusal to produce proof that 
the property was in plaintiff's name, apparently to plaintiff's 
satisfaction, on the ground that the relatives, who had never 
before shown any concern for plaintiff's welfare, were trying 
to take the property from her and that since plaintiff knew 
the property was in her name,it was unnecessary to prove 
that fact to the relatives. In "iew of plaintiff's lack of educa-
tion and her reliance upon the decedent for advice, it cannot 
be said as a matter of law that the recited incident was suffi-
cient to put plaintiff on notice of the decedent's fraud. (Seeger 
5iO ESTATE OF WOLFE {48 C.2d 
v. Odell, 18 Ca1.2d 409, 415, 418 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 
1291].) 
Defendant contends that the court's findings favorable to 
plaintiff are not supported by the evidence on the ground that 
the testimony given by plaintiff in her own behalf is inherently 
improbable. We have reviewed the evidence and find defend-
ant's contention without merit. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
